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NOTE
Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the
Plight of the "Innocent Owner"
I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the nation's war on drugs, Congress enacted
legislation directed at broadening the powers of the federal gov-
ernment to combat illegal narcotics activities. A central feature of
this legislation was 21 U.S.C. § 881,' a statute which has evolved
into the government's primary civil forfeiture weapon utilized in
the trenches of the drug war.
A concept of biblical origins, civil forfeiture' has proven an
effective and extremely controversial4 method of depriving drug
1 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2 See infra Part II.
3 This Note focuses on civil, as opposed to criminal forfeiture. Civil forfeitures are
in rem actions adhering to the notion that "[i]t is the property which is proceeded
against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were
conscious instead of inanimate and insentient." Various Items of Personal Property v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931). Thus, in a civil forfeiture action, the defendant
is the property itself rather than the property owner. The property owner in a civil for-
feiture action is often referred to as the "claimant."
In contrast, criminal forfeitures are in personam actions requiring defendants to be
found guilty of a crime prior to the forfeiture of their property. For examples of crimi-
nal forfeiture statutes, see infra note 40.
4 One commentator chronicles the controversy surrounding civil forfeiture as fol-
lows:
[T]he government's overzealous forfeiture efforts are being criticized by the
courts, the media, legal commentators, bar associations, civil liberties organiza-
tions, some members of Congress, and even by the prosecutors responsible for
leading and directing the federal forfeiture program. We are witnessing a major
swing of the law enforcement pendulum. After years of relentless expansion, our
forfeiture laws are in for a long overdue review by the courts, legislatures and
the Clinton Department of Justice. There is a widely perceived need to reform
these laws and the way they are being implemented to make them fairer and to
prevent the kinds of abuses that have occurred.
1 DAVID B. SMrrH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FoRFErruRE CASES 1 1.02, at 1-19 (1985
& Supp. 1994).
This statement is buttressed by the fact that the Supreme Court ruled against the
government in all of its recent civil forfeiture cases. See United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (1994) (holding that the Due Process Clause
requires the government to afford notice and an opportunity to be heard before seizing
real property subject to civil forfeiture); Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803
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offenders the economic benefits of their crimes.' Under section
881, for example, the government may seize a broad array of
property based merely on a showing of probable cause that the
property was derived from, or facilitated illegal narcotics activities.'
Once the government has established probable cause, the burden
shifts to the property owner to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that this illegal activity did not occur or that the
owner fulfills the requirements of an affirmative defense to forfei-
ture.
7
While civil forfeiture provides an uncharitable mechanism to
deprive drug traffickers of their assets, it also yields unintended
consequences for persons unconnected with the drug trade but
(1993) (looking past guilty-property fiction and holding that civil forfeitures may consti-
tute Excessive Fines under Eighth Amendment); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,
113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion); Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 554, 562 (1992) (holding that government cannot deprive the appellate court of juris-
diction by transferring forfeited property out of judicial district). Cf Dep't of Revenue of
Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994) ("A defendant convicted and
punished for an offense may not have a nonremedial civil penalty imposed against him
for the same offense in a separate proceeding.").
Furthermore, statements by the members of the Supreme Court and the Appellate
Courts indicate an increasing distrust of the government's use of civil forfeiture. James
Daniel Good Real Prperty, 114 S. Ct. at 515 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (stating a "distrust of the Government's aggressive use of broad civil forfeiture stat-
utes."); United States v. $191,910.00, 16 F.3d 1051, 1068-69 (9th cir. 1994) ("The relative
ease of obtaining forfeitures may tempt the government to seek criminal law enforcement
objectives through these nominally 'civil' proceedings.").
Indeed, it appears that the call for forfeiture reform has created some strange polit-
ical bedfellows. For example, when Representative Henry Hyde, a conservative Republican
from Illinois, held a press conference to announce his proposed asset forfeiture reform
bill, he was joined by the president of the American Civil Liberties Union. Lynne Marek,
Hyde Seeks to Curb Prperty Seizures by U.S., CHI. TRIB., June 16, 1993, at 2. The Hyde Bill
will be discussed infra notes 85, 102 and accompanying text.
5 Congress stated the purpose of forfeiture as follows:
[T]he conviction of individual racketeers and drug dealers [is] of only limited
effectiveness if the economic power bases of criminal organizations or enterprises
[are] left in intact . . . . Today, few in Congress or the law enforcement com-
munity fail to recognize that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and im-
prisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in
dangerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant violence, is plaguing the
country. Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug
trafficking are to be successful, they must include an attack on the economic
aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an at-
tack may be made.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3374.
6 See infra Part IIIA.
7 See infra Parts III.B., IV.
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who have had their property forfeited due to the illegal activities
of third parties. Unable to prove that their property did not derive
from or facilitate illegal activity, these owners are forced to prove
an affirmative defense or concede to the forfeiture.
The primary affirmative defense available to these owners
under section 881 is known as the "innocent owner" defense. This
defense permits a property owner to defeat a forfeiture action by
establishing that the illegal activity subjecting the property to for-
feiture was committed "without the knowledge or consent of that
owner."' The protection afforded to owners by the innocent own-
er defense is questionable, however, because two problems sur-
round the defense: (1) chronic inconsistent judicial interpretation;
and (2) the unforeseen repercussions of the Supreme Court deci-
sion United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue.9
Many property owners choosing to assert the innocent owner
defense are burdened by inconsistent judicial interpretation of the
statutory phrase "without the knowledge or consent of that own-
er." Some jurisdictions give this phrase a conjunctive meaning,
requiring an owner to prove both lack of knowledge and lack of
consent to defeat a forfeiture. Other jurisdictions interpret the
phrase disjunctively, allowing the owner to prove either lack of
knowledge or lack of consent to defeat a forfeiture action. Finally,
there are many jurisdictions that refuse to take any position, leav-
ing the determination of the conjunctive or disjunctive question to
the lower courts. Moreover, courts have also inconsistently defined
the statutory terms "knowledge" and "consent". This inconsistent
judicial interpretation renders the standard for "innocence" under
the innocent owner defense unclear.
Further complicating the innocent owner defense is the re-
cent decision United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue. Prior to 92
Buena Vista Avenue, courts were split as to whether the innocent
owner defense was available to an owner who obtained an interest
in the property after the illegal activity giving rise to the forfeiture
had occurred."0 In 92 Buena Vista Avenue, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court specifically addressed the issue by permitting donees
8 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6),(7) (1988). Cf 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988). Although
each of the primary forfeiture provisions under § 881 provides for separate innocent
owner defenses, this Note will consider the defense as a single entity. The rationale for
this approach is that each provision's version of the defense is similarly worded and ap-
plied thereby rending distinction unnecessary.
9 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion).
10 See infra Part IV.D.
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and other post-illegal act transferees" of forfeitable property to
claim protection under the defense. Unfortunately, however, the
Court declined the opportunity to clarify how the innocent owner
defense should be applied to these owners. Therefore, courts have
been left to apply their pre-92 Buena Vista Avenue interpretation of
the innocent owner defense to these claimants. As this Note will
illustrate, post-illegal act transferees can always defeat a forfeiture
action under the disjunctive interpretation of the innocent owner
defense. This has left a major loophole in forfeiture law.
These and other problems 12 have fueled an atmosphere of
uncertainty surrounding the application and stability of the inno-
cent owner defense. Accordingly, this Note considers the plight of
the unintended casualties of this nation's war on drugs-the inno-
cent owners of property forfeited to the government due to the
illegal conduct of third parties. Part II traces the origins of civil
forfeiture from biblical times to the modern-day war on drugs.
Part III provides a substantive and procedural overview of 21
U.S.C. § 881, the primary civil forfeiture statutory weapon utilized
in the drug war. Part IV provides a detailed discussion of the
innocent owner defense under section 881, emphasizing the cur-
rent inconsistent judicial interpretation of the defense.
Within the context of United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,13
Part V discusses the right of donees and other post-illegal act
transferees to seek the protection of the innocent owner defense
under section 881. Based on this foundation, Part VI addresses the
central problems underlying the current application of the inno-
cent owner defense: inconsistent judicial interpretation and the
need to reconcile the defense with the post-illegal act transferees
of forfeitable property. Part VII proposes amendments to section
881 that would balance the interest of innocent owners and the
government. The proposed amendment would not only benefit
claimants by providing a consistent standard for "innocence" un-
der the defense, but it also would benefit the government by clari-
fying the rights of post-illegal act transferees, thereby avoiding a
major loophole in forfeiture law. Part VIII concludes that until the
courts and legislature are willing to provide a consistent interpreta-
tion of the innocent owner defense that protects the rights of all
11 As used in this Note, a "post-illegal act transferee" means a person who acquired
an interest in forfeitable property after the illegal acts subjecting the property to forfei-
ture had occurred.
12 See discussion infra Part IV.
13 92 Buena Vita Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126.
[Vol. 70:2
NOTE-CIVIL FORFEITURE
parties involved, the innocent owners of property forfeitable under
section 881 will continue to be casualties of our nation's war on
drugs.
II. THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox
shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the
owner of the ox shall be quit.14
Thus was born the concept of civil forfeiture.' 5 But why this
fiction of "punishing" an inanimate object? And more importantly,
how did this practice eventually manifest itself in modern law?
In his book, The Common Law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. traced the origin of in rem forfeitures to humankind's predilec-
tion for personifying inanimate objects. 6 Holmes observed that
"[a]n untrained intelligence only imperfectly performs the analysis
by which jurists carry responsibility back to the beginning of a
chain of causation. The hatred for anything giving us pain, which
wrecks itself on the manifest cause ... leads even civilized man to
kick a door when it pinches his finger ... ."1 It was this "un-
trained intelligence" that was the basis for early English laws from
which the principles of modern forfeiture law in this country were
derived. The primary sources of English forfeiture law were the
medieval "institution of the deodand" 8 and early English admiral-
ty law. 9 The "institution of the deodand" ° made any object
14 Exodus 21:28.
15 Cf Alison R. Solomon, Comment, Drugs and Money: How Successful is the Seizure
and Fmfeiture Program At Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds?, 42 EMORY LJ. 1149,
1149 (1993). For a complete review of the historical development of forfeiture law, see
generally 1 SMrrH, supra note 4.
16 OLVER W. HOLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 11 (Little, Brown & Co. ed. 1923);
Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil
Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 241, 246 (1994).
17 See sources cited supra note 16.
18 See generally Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Coring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notation of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. LQ.
169 (1973). But see James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law--Banished at
Last?, 62 COPRNELL L. REv. 768, 772 (1977) ("[Rleliance upon deodand as a general for-
feiture principle of early English law is probably misplaced.").
19 See generally Maxeiner, supra note 18, at 771-77. Another source of English forfei-
ture law was forfeiture upon conviction for a felony or treason, known as forfeitures of
the estate. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht easing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). In
Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court stated:
The convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated
1994]
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causing the death of a person subject to forfeiture to the
crown. The offending instrument was forfeited to the King "in
the belief that the King would provide money for Masses to be
said for the good of the dead man's soul, or insure that the deo-
dand was put to charitable uses."22 Although deodands did not
become part of the common law tradition in this country, 3
[1]ong before the adoption of the Constitution the common
law courts in the Colonies-and later in the states during the
period of Confederation-were exercising jurisdiction in rem in
the enforcement of [English and local] forfeiture statutes,
which provided for the forfeiture of commodities and vessels
used in violation of customs and revenue laws.
2 4
Thus, English admiralty laws served as a solid foundation for
modem civil forfeiture laws.' In fact, almost immediately after
to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and personal,
to the Crown. The basis for these forfeitures was that a breach of the criminal
law was an offense to the King's peace, which was felt to justify denial of the
right to own property.
Id. at 682 (citations omitted).
Thus, unlike civil forfeiture, the principle behind forfeiture of the estate was pun-
ishing the wrongdoer (as opposed to the property), which is the same purpose that un-
derlies modem criminal forfeiture statutes.
20 The word "deodand" derives from the latin term Deo dandum, which translates as
"given to God" or "to be given to God." Finkelstein, supra note 18, at 180 n.35.; accord
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16.
21 Thus, "[i]f a man fell from a tree, the tree was deodand. If he drowned in a
well, the well was to be filled up. It ' did not matter that the forfeited instrument be-
longed to an innocent person." HOLMES, supra note 16, at 24-25 (footnotes omitted).
However, by 1280 the forfeiture of the actual offending object of death was replaced by
a system whereby the mere value of the object was forfeited to the King. Finkelstein,
supra note 18, at 182 n.45; see also 1 SMrrH, supra note 4, 1 2.02, at 2-3 n.3.
22 Calrao-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681. The application of the deodand for religious pur-
poses eventually ceased, however, and the purpose of the deodand became a means for
providing a source of revenue for the Crown justified as a penalty for carelessness. Id.
This new justification for forfeiture eventually manifested itself in the abolition of the
deodand institution, and the contemporaneous passage of Lord Campbell's Act creating a
cause of action for wrongful death. Id. at 681 n.19.
23 Id. at 682.
24 Id. at 683 (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting CJ. Hendry Co.
v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943)).
25 Unlike the initial purpose of the deodand, forfeiture under the English admiralty
statutes did not have the religious underpinnings.
The Navigation Acts of 1660, which required the shipping of commodities in
English vessels, were a major component of English policy to promote domi-
nance at sea. These Acts were made applicable to the colonies, and enforced in




the Constitution was adopted, a federal statute was enacted mak-
ing ships and cargo involved in customs offenses subject to forfei-
ture." These initial federal civil forfeiture statutes served vital na-
tional interests during the early days of our Republic." In times
of war, vessel forfeitures were used to destroy the maritime
strength of our enemies. Such provisions were also utilized dur-
ing the Revolutionary War to seize Tory property and later to
seize Confederate property during the Civil War. 9 Despite its ear-
ly roots, however, forfeiture played an insignificant role in Ameri-
can law" until our nation was confronted with a new war-the
war on drugs.
III. MODERN FORFEITURE LAW AND THE WAR ON DRUGS:
21 U.S.C. § 881
Although the nation's infamous "war on drugs" is often attrib-
uted to the Reagan-Bush era, this war has actually been waged by
every administration since that of John F. Kennedy."t Ironically,
despite strong federal efforts our nation has consistently been the
greatest casualty of this war.' Recognizing that traditional meth-
odis of law enforcement were ineffective in curtailing the lucrative
drug trade," Congress actively created new weapons to help
America kick its drug habit. In 1970, Congress took the first step
in this initiative by enacting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),' the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
statute (CCE),M and importantly, the initial version of section 881
Leach & Malcolm, supra note 16, at 248 n.25.
26 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683; see also Leach & Malcolm, supra note 16, at 248
n.25.
27 1 SMITH, supra note 4, 1 2.01, at 2-2; Leach & Malcolm, supra note 16, at 248.
28 See sources cited supra note 27.
29 See sources cited supra note 27.
30 See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1133 (plurality opinion)
(describing the modem evolution of forfeiture laws as "an important expansion of gov-
ernmental power.").
31 Kelly McClure, Note, Federal Civil Forfeiture of Assets: How It Works and Why It Must,
11 U. BRIMDEPORT L. REV. 419, 442 (1991). For a critical evaluation of the American
drug policy, see generally WAR ON DRUGS STUDIES IN THE FAILURE OF U.S. NARcoTcs
POLICY (Alfred W. McCoy & Alan A. Block eds., 1992).
32 See discussion supra note 5.
33 See discussion supra note 5.
34 RICO was enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 992, 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
35 CCE was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
19941
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of the Controlled Substances Act."5 This legislation was based on
the premise that crime does pay. In short, Congress realized that
"if law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug traf-
ficking are to be successful, they must include an attack on the
economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism
through which such an attack may be made."37
Eventually it became apparent, however, that forfeiture was
not fulfilling its anticipated goals.3 Consequently, by 1984 Con-
gress had enacted legislation to increase the efficiency of civil and
criminal forfeiture laws by vastly expanding the categories of prop-
erty subject to forfeiture. 9 Since that time, the most effective,
most utilized, and most criticized statute to combat the war on
drugs has been 21 U.S.C. § 881.
A. § 881 Substantive Overview
Forfeiture is currently authorized by more than 100 federal
statutes,' providing for confiscation of everything from diseased
trol Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
36 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
37 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA-N. at 3374.
38 In 1984, Congress reviewed a report released by the General Accounting Office
which found that asset forfeiture was not being pursued aggressively under the statutes.
In fact, the report found that from 1970 to 1980 the RICO and CCE statutes had been
used in only 98 drug cases wherein the assets subject to forfeiture in those cases only
amounted to $2,000,000. See source cited supra notes 5, 37; see also 1 SMrrH, supra note
4, 1.01, at 1-5 n.11.
39 For example, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) was enacted as part of the Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), § 511(a) (6), 92 Stat. 3768, 3777
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) (1988)). 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) was enacted as part of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), §
511(a)(7), 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)). The fact that
§ 881 is the most central forfeiture statute utilized to fight the drug war can be attribut-
ed to the enactment of these two sections. See discussion infra Part ImA-B.
40 Some examples of non-drug related civil forfeiture statutes include: 18 U.S.C §
981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (forfeiture of any property involved in illegal money launder-
ing transactions); 18 U.S.C. § 512 (1988) (forfeiture of vehicles which have removed,
obliterated or altered identification number); 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1988) (forfeiture of
any property used in conducting an illegal gambling business); 18 U.S.C § 2254 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (forfeiture of objects depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct). Additionally, there are a number of criminal forfeiture statutes which provide the
property owners with many more procedural rights than civil forfeiture statutes. For two
common examples of criminal forfeiture statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (forfeiture of any interest in property acquired or maintained in violation of RICO
substantive provisions); 21 U.S.C § 853 (1988) (forfeiture of property obtained from or
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poultry41 to pornographic magazines. 2 Notwithstanding the wide
array of both criminal and civil forfeiture statutes, the nation's
drug crisis has encouraged the disproportionate use of section
881. Three subsections under 21 U.S.C. § 881 generally govern the
majority of circumstances in which property related to narcotics
trafficking is forfeited to the government: (1) section 881(a)(4)
provides for the forfeiture of conveyances (including aircraft, vehi-
cles, or vessels) that are used to facilitate illegal narcotics transac-
tions; (2) section 881(a)(6) authorizes the forfeiture of anything
of value furnished in exchange for illegal drugs, proceeds trace-
able to such exchanges, and moneys used to facilitate illegal nar-
cotics transactions; and (3) section 881(a)(7) authorizes the forfei-
ture of real property, when it is used to facilitate illegal narcotics
transactions.
facilitating narcotics violation after owner is convicted of such offense).
41 See 21 U.S.C. § 467b(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 1466 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
43 Other forfeitable items under § 881 include:
(1) Controlled Substances. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a) (1),(8) (1988).
(2) Raw Materials, Products, and Equipment. "All raw materials, products, and
equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, com-
pounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in
violation of [federal drug laws]." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(2) (1988). Thus, this provision can
be utilized for the forfeiture of anything from electronic equipment to crack vials. See
United States v. Kim, 803 F. Supp. 352, 361 (D. Haw. 1992) (government seized cellular
telephone where there was probable cause to believe that claimant had used it to facili-
tate delivery, importation or exportation of controlled substances), affld, 25 F.3d 1426
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bank of New York, 14 F.3d 756 (2d Cir. 1994) (forfei-
ture of crack vials and proceeds from the sale of crack vials).
(3) Containers. "All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for
property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9)." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(3) (1988). Exam-
ples of property subject to forfeiture under this provision include luggage, furniture or
any other property that is used to smuggle or contain illegal drugs. Compare United
States v. Ladesma, 499 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1974) (government seized a trunk which had
cocaine in false bottom), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1024 (1974). One district court has specifi-
cally held that a mobile home which contained marijuana was not a "container" for the
purposes of this provision. United States v. 1989 Stratford Fairmount 14' x 70' Mobile
Home, 783 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. III. 1992), afld, 986 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1993).
(4) Books, Records, and Research. "All books, records, and research, including for-
mulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of
[federal drug laws]." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(5) (1988). While this provision could conceivably
reach books and magazines detailing how to cultivate drugs, one district court construed
an analogous state forfeiture statute so as to not permit the forfeiture of books of gener-
al literature and distribution. See Kane v. McDaniel, 407 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (W.D. Ky.
1975) (not permitting the forfeiture of books entitled "Child's Garden of Grass," "Sexual
Power of Marijuana," and "The Pot Report").
(5) Chemicals, Equipment, Machines, and Capsules. See generally 21 U.S.C. §
881(a) (9) (1988).
1994]
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1. Forfeiture of Conveyances - § 881 (a) (4)
Section 881 (a) (4) provides for the forfeiture of "[a]ll convey-
ances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or
are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of"
controlled substances or the equipment or raw materials used to
make controlled substances." Forfeiture under this provision
commonly occurs where an automobile or aircraft is used to trans-
port or facilitate the delivery of illegal drugs.45 However, a recent
Seventh Circuit case permitted the forfeiture of a vehicle which
was used merely to transport its owner to and from the scene of a
drug meeting. The vehicle neither carried nor concealed any
drugs.'
There are three statutory exemptions to forfeiture of other-
wise guilty conveyances. The first exemption states that common
carriers are not subject to forfeiture unless it appears "that the
owner or other person in charge of such conveyance was a con-
senting party or privy to" a violation of federal drug laws .4  The
second exempts conveyances if the owner can prove that the ille-
gal use of the conveyance occurred while the property was illegally
in possession of someone other than the owner.' Finally, the
third exemption outlines an innocent owner defense directing that
a conveyance cannot be forfeited for illegal acts "committed or
omitted without the knowledge, consent, or wilful blindness of the
(6) Drug Paraphernalia. "Any drug paraphernalia (as defined in [21 U.S.C. §
863])." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(10) (Supp. V 1993). Thus, property subject to forfeiture un-
der this provision include "any equipment, product, or material of any kind which is pri-
marily intended or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, converting...
or ... introducing into the human body a controlled substance . . . ." 21 U.S.C. §
863(d) (Supp. V 1993) (providing examples such as water pipes, roach clips, bongs, and
cocaine freebase kits).
(7) Firearms. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(11) (Supp. V 1993).
For a thorough discussion of items forfeitable under § 881, see generally ASSET
FORFEITURE OFFIcE, I ASSET FORFErruRE MANUAL (1993).
44 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988). Thus, § 881(a)(4) authorizes forfeiture of convey-
ances used in one of two ways: (1) to transport illegal drugs and the like; or (2) to
facilitate in any manner the transport, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of illegal
drugs or the like. See United States v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 1993).
45 See, e.g., United States v. 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, No. 92-15350, 1994 WL
528447, at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994) (forfeiture of airplane used to transport or facili-
tate delivery of illegal controlled substances).
46 See generally 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d 651.
47 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A) (1988).
48 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(B) (1988).
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owner."49 The person attempting to utilize one of these exemp-
tions has the burden of presenting at trial the evidence establish-
ing the defense."
2. Forfeiture of Exchange Money, Traceable Proceeds, and
Facilitating Money - § 881(a) (6)
Section 881(a)(6) provides three provisions that allow for the
forfeiture of three types of property.1 First, an exchange provi-
sion allows forfeiture of anything of value exchanged or intended
to be exchanged for a controlled substance. 2 Many forfeiture
cases under the exchange provision involve situations where the
only evidence of an exchange was either the mere proximity of
large sums of money found near drugs or drug paraphernalia,"
or where a person carrying a large sum of money acts in a suspi-
cious manner.' Second, a proceeds provision allows forfeiture of
all proceeds traceable to such an exchange.5 Thus, where there
49 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4)(C) (1988). The innocent owner defense will be discussed
infra Part V. One commentator states that the innocent owner defense was added to §
881(a) (4) due to congressional pressure stemming from abuses of the statute in an at-
tempt to uphold the Reagan Administration's "zero tolerance" policy toward drug users.
See 1 SMrrH, supra note 4, 1 4.02, at 4-9 to 4-10.
50 See infra Part IV.
51 Section 881(a)(6) provides for forfeiture of:
[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an ex-
change, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended
to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
52 Although the exchange provision specifically refers to "moneys, negotiable instru-
ments, and securities," it is not limited to these items. It also applies to "[any] other
things of value" exchanged or intended to be exchanged for drugs. Compare 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6) (the facilitation provision of § 881(a)(6) is limited to moneys, negotiable in-
struments and securities).
53 See, e.g., United States v. $91,960.00, 897 F.2d 1457, 1462 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he
discovery of a large sum of money, unexplained and in conjunction with the presence of
drug paraphernalia, may constitute evidence of probable cause.").
54 For example, a recent Eleventh Circuit case held that probable cause existed
under § 881(a)(6) for the forfeiture of $121,100, where an individual was at the airport,
held a large quantity of cash, bought his airline ticket in cash under a false name, acted
nervously and had a history of drug violations. United States v. $121,100.00, 999 F.2d
1503, 1508 (11th Cir. 1993).
55 As used in § 881(a)(6), the word "proceeds" means property derived from money
or other things of value directly exchanged for drugs. For example, property acquired
with the profits of drug trafficking. Thus, if cash acquired in exchange for drugs is used
to purchase a house and the house is later sold for cash, that cash is forfeitable under
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is probable cause to believe that a home or other property was
purchased with money exchanged for illegal drugs, the property
may be forfeitable as proceeds of illegal drug activity.5" Finally, a
facilitation provision allows forfeiture of all moneys, negotiable
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facili-
tate any federal drug law violation.57 For example, a recent
Fourth Circuit case held that probable cause existed for the forfei-
ture of $15,716 which the claimant had intended to use to finance
a clothing store. 8 The money was subject to forfeiture under the
facilitation provision because the clothing store was used merely as
"a front for [the claimant's] drug sales," thereby rendering the
money a facilitator of illegal narcotics activity. 9 Section 881(a)(6)
contains an innocent owner defense for all legal and equitable
owners of an interest in the exchange monies, traceable proceeds,
or facilitating monies sought to be forfeited if they can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that they did not know or consent
to the underlying illegal conduct.6
3. Forfeiture of Real Property - § 881 (a) (7)
As part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,1
the proceeds provision of § 881 (a) (6), but the original cash obtained from the sale of
drugs is not (the original cash would be forfeitable under the exchange provision of §
881(a)(6)). See 1 SMrrH, supra note 4, 1 4.03, at 4-82.
Additionally, in order for proceeds to be forfeited they must be traceable to drug
trafficking activity. It appears that such tracing need not be to a particular drug transac-
tion. Rather, it is enough that the government trace the proceeds to drug activity in
general. United States v. $87,060, 23 F.3d 1352, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Circumstantial
evidence may be considered and the government need not trace the property to a specif-
ic drug transaction."); $121,100.00, 999 F.2d at 1508 ("The government need not connect
the defendant currency to any particular drug transaction."). Obviously, to require the
government to trace proceeds to particular transactions would be a nearly insurmountable
obstacle.
56 See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opin-
ion); United States v. Chandler, No. 93-2064, 1994 WL 523993 (4th Cir. Sept. 27, 1994).
57 The facilitation provision is both broader and narrower than the exchange and
proceeds provisions of § 881(a)(6). It is broader because it permits the forfeiture of
property that is merely used or intended to be used to facilitate felony drug violations.
The other two provisions are limited to violations involving the "exchange" of drugs. The
provision is narrower in that it merely provides for the forfeiture of "moneys, negotiable
instruments, and securities," whereas the other provisions permit forfeiture of "other
things of value." See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
58 United States v. Perez, No. 92-2152, 1994 WL 318760, at *3 (4th Cir. July 1,
1994).
59 Id. at *2.
60 See discussion infra Part IV.
61 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, § 306(a), §
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Congress added section (a) (7) to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). This section
authorizes the forfeiture of "[alll real property... which is used,
or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of' felony narcotics transactions.12 For-
feiture under this provision often occurs when a drug sale or
meeting occurs on the real property.6s However, courts have per-
mitted the government to forfeit property under this provision
where the property was used to grow marijuana,' and have even
permitted the forfeiture of a home where the owner merely used
the home telephone to negotiate and arrange a drug transac-
tion.'
Like sections 881 (a) (4) and (a) (6), section 881(a) (7) contains
a statutory innocent owner defense.'
Finally, it should be noted that because the three primary
forfeiture provisions under section 881 authorize forfeiture of
property that merely "facilitates" illegal narcotics activity, questions
arise as to how "connected" this property must be to the illegal
activity. According to Congress, "it is the intent of these provisions
that the property would be forfeited only if there is a substantial
connection between the property and the underlying criminal activi-
511(a) (7), 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7) (1988)).
62 Section 881 (a) (7) provides for the forfeiture of:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter pun-
ishable by more than one year's imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
63 See, e.g., United States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1994).
64 See United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17, Great Harbor Neck, 960 F.2d 200 (1st Cir.
1992).
65 United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. deniel 498
U.S. 1126 (1991). The broad language of § 881(a)(7), creates an issue of the potential
for disproportionality between the offense and the forfeited property. By its language, §
881(a) (7) would permit a huge estate to be forfeited if any part of it was used, or was
intended to be used, to facilitate an small felony drug offense. While most courts have
alleviated some of the disproportionality concerns by requiring that there be a "substan-
tial connection" between the property and the underlying illegal activity, many courts
have decline to follow the "substantial connection" test. See United States v. 916 Douglas
Ave., 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991). Such problems will
likely be reduced, however, by the recent decision of Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2801, 2803 (1993), wherein the Supreme Court looked past the "guilty-property" fiction
and permitted Excessive Fines Clause challenges to civil forfeitures under the Eighth
Aniendment.
66 See discussion infra Part IV.
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ty which the statute seeks to prevent." 7 While many courts have
required this "substantial connection" between the property and
the unlawful conduct triggering the forfeiture,' other courts have
held that "the government must demonstrate only a 'nexus' be-
tween the seized property and illegal drug activity."69
B. § 881 Procedural Overview
Because forfeiture under section 881 is an in rem action, "[ilt
is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a
legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were con-
scious instead of inanimate and insentient."" This "guilty-proper-
ty" fiction has enabled civil- forfeiture to avoid many of the proce-
dural safeguards afforded in criminal proceedings.7 In fact, the
property owned by a person acquitted of a criminal narcotics of-
fense may still be subject to civil forfeiture.72 Furthermore, be-
67 124 CONG. REc. 34670, 34671 (1978) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9496, 9522.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, 998 F.2d 204, 212 (4th Cir.
1993) ("[T]he mere fact that land provides a 'means of access' by which contraband
reaches a public highway can hardly be said to establish the 'substantial connection'
[test].").
69 United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 56 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1538 (1994). One court has noted, however, that the differences between the "substantial
connection" test and other approaches is largely "semantical rather than practical." 916
Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d at 494.
70 Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931). See
also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808-09 (1993) (citations omitted) ("The fic-
tion 'that the thing is primarily considered the offender,' has a venerable history in our
case law.").
71 For example, civil forfeiture under § 881 does not require a criminal conviction
for forfeiture to occur. As stated in one of the earliest forfeiture cases: "[T]he practice
has been, and so this Court understand [sic] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem
stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam."
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827).
72 For example, one district court held that the government was not precluded from
bringing a forfeiture action against a vehicle which had been used to transport contra-
band despite the fact that the owner of the vehicle was acquitted of narcotics charges
arising out of the same events on which the forfeiture was based. United States v. 1977
Chevrolet Pickup, 503 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Colo. 1980). See also United States v. 89 Fire-
arms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); United States v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987). In light of Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993),
however, wherein the Court recognized the punitive aspects of civil forfeiture, it is likely
that forfeiture after a criminal acquittal may constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
For recent cases considering the Double Jeopardy Clause implications of bringing
forfeiture actions and criminal actions in separate proceedings, see United States v.
$405,089.23, No. 93-55947, 1994 WL 476736, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 1994) (Double Jeop-
ardy Clause violated where criminal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings are held
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cause one of the earliest sources of forfeiture law was admiralty
law,"3 many civil forfeiture statutes, including section 881, specifi-
cally incorporate procedures from admiralty and customs laws. 4
Accordingly, under section 881 the government has the initial
burden of proving merely that there is probable cause to believe
that the seized property is subject to forfeiture.75
Probable cause in the forfeiture context has generally been
separately). See also United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1464-65 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating
that "parallel [forfeiture] and criminal actions do not necessarily violate the Double Jeop- -
ardy clause," but noting that the government "would do well to seek imprisonment, fines,
and forfeiture in one proceeding."). Cf. Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), wherein the Court held that a "civil" tax assessed on possession
of illegal drugs after the state has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct vio-
lates Double Jeopardy under Fifth Amendment. The court stated that "[a] defendant
convicted and punished for an offense may not have a nonremedial civil penalty imposed
against him for the same offense in a separate proceeding." Id. at 1945 (emphasis add-
ed). In light of the Austin case which recognized that civil forfeiture may violate the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive fines, (and thus may be a
nonremedial civil penalty), the Kurth Ranch case has obvious Double Jeopardy implications
in the context of civil forfeiture.
73 See supra Part 11.
74 Hence, 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) states:
The provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture,
and condemnation of property for violation of the customs law, the disposition
of such property or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the remission or mitiga-
tion of such forfeitures; and the compromise of claims shall apply to seizures
and forfeitures incurred . . . under any of the provisions of this subchap-
ter ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
The burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings under customs laws is set forth in 19
U.S.C. § 1615 which provides:
In all suits or actions . . . brought for the forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle, air-
craft, merchandise, or baggage seized ... where the property is claimed by any
person, the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant; and in all suits or
actions brought for the recovery of the value of any vessel, vehicle, aircraft,
merchandise, or baggage, because of violation of any such law, the burden of
proof shall be upon the defendant: Provided, That probable cause shall be first
shown for the institution of such suit or action, to be judged by the
court ....
19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988).
Consequently, under § 881 (as it incorporates 19 U.S.C.. § 1615), the government
need only show probable cause to seize property and commence a forfeiture action.
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the property is not subject to forfeiture.
75 See, e.g., United States v. $191,910.00, 16 F.3d 1051, 1071 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
probable cause for forfeiture of property under § 881(a)(6)); United States v. Bizzell, 19
F.3d 1524, 1527 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding probable cause for forfeiture of property
under § 881(a)(4)); United States v. Rural Route 1, Box 137-B, 24 F.3d 845, 848 (6th
Cir. 1994) (finding probable cause for forfeiture of property under § 881(a)(7)).
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defined by courts to mean a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,
supported by less than prima facia proof, but more than mere
suspicion.'6 The government may rely on circumstantial and hear-
say evidence to establish probable cause,7 7 while the claimant can-
not rely on such evidence in rebuttal. Once the government
shows probable cause to believe that the property is subject to for-
feiture, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant.
79
Thus, unlike a criminal trial where the government must
prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt," a
forfeiture action under section 881 requires the property owner to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is
not subject to forfeiture or that the owner has an affirmative de-
fense." Therefore, to the surprise of many, the axiom pro bandi
necessitas incumbit illi qui agit (he who sues must carry the burden
of proof),82 has few implications in the context of civil forfeiture.
Although criticized," this burden-shifting procedure has been
76 See cases cited supra note 75.
77 See, e.g., United States v. $87,060.00, 23 F.3d 1352, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Circum-
stantial evidence may be considered . . . ."); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 56
(2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) ("A finding of probable cause may be based on hear-
say ...or circumstantial evidence . . ."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538 (1994).
78 See, e.g., United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1990); Unit-
ed States v. 1986 Nissan Maxima GL, 895 F.2d 1063, 1065 (5th Cir. 1990); United States
v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. $250,000, 808 F.2d 895,
899 (1st Cir. 1987).
79 See, e.g., $87,060.00, 23 F.3d at 1354 ("Once the government establishes probable
cause, the burden shifts to the claimant to show that the property was not connected to
a crime."); United States v. RR #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Once the
Government has provided sufficient evidence to show ptobable cause, the burden shifts
to the defendant-owner to rebut the property's connection to his criminal activi-
ty . . . ."); United States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Once the
Government has established probable cause, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant
opposing forfeiture.").
80 See, e.g., In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1975) (government required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute crime).
81 For example, if the owner cannot show that the illegal activity giving rise to the
forfeiture did not occur, she may raise the affirmative innocent owner defense. See infra
Part IV.
82 1 SMrrH, supra note 4, 1 11.02, at 11-9.
83 For example, Judge George C. Pratt, of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
recently stated:
While we also might question the wisdom of forcing the owner of the seized
property to prove the property is "innocent", rather than making the govern-
ment prove the property is "guilty", the constitutionality of congress's [sic] allo-
cation of the burdens of proof in forfeiture cases has been upheld.




upheld repeatedly against constitutional challenges."
A proposed amendment to section 881 would place the bur-
den of proof on the government. The amendment, known as the
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993, would revise 19 U.S.C. §
1615 (admiralty and customs procedures as incorporated by sec-
tion 881(d)) requiring the government to -prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture.s
In addition to these procedural constraints, until recently
forfeiture claimants had limited due process rights. However, in
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,s the Supreme
Court held that due process requires pre-seizure notice and an
adversary hearing prior to the forfeiture of any real property for-
feited pursuant to section 881(a) (7).
Forfeiture under section 881 clearly encompasses a broad
array of property and includes a disadvantageous procedural pro-
cess for claimants. Standing alone, these factors expose many own-
ers to forfeiture as a result of illegal activity that they did not
participate in or even know of. In an attempt to protect these
property owners, Congress included an innocent owner defense in
each of the primary forfeiture provisions under section 881.
IV. § 881 AND THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE
Traditionally, "the innocence of the owner of property subject
84 See, e.g., United States v. White Hill Rd., 916 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. $250,000, 808 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1987). Many of the courts that
have upheld burden-shifting, however, have relied on the civil/remedial character of civil
forfeiture statutes. See id. The reasoning of these courts is now questionable in light of
Austin y. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), wherein the Supreme Court held that
forfeitures are punishment subject to limitations under the Excessive Fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment. For a discussion of the implications of the Austin decision on bur-
den-shifting and other areas of civil forfeiture law, see generally Robin M. Sackett, The
Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending Constitutional Protections to Claimants in Civil
Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1994) (stating that burden-shifting
in civil forfeiture "shocks the conscience" and that "[t]he burden of proof requirements
in civil forfeiture proceedings must be changed."). For a pre-Austin discussion of the
inequities of burden-shifting in civil forfeiture, see Christine M. Durkin, Note, Civil For-
feiture Under Federal Narcotics Law: The Impact of the Shifling Burden of Proof Upon the Fsifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 679, 683 (1990) (argu-
ing that burden-shifting under § 881 violates owner's privilege against self-incrimination
under Fifth Amendment).
85 See generally The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 2417, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
86 114 S. Ct. 492 (1994).
87 Id. at 505.
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to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense. " '
Despite this traditional rule, each of the three primary statutory
forfeiture provisions under section 881 provide for an innocent
owner defense, whereby an owner may defeat a forfeiture by estab-
lishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged
wrongful act was "committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner."89 Unfortunately, courts have struggled in
defining a consistent standard for "innocence" under the defense.
Courts have had difficulty determining: (1) whether the innocent
owner defense should have a conjunctive or disjunctive meaning;
(2) what constitutes "knowledge"; (3) what constitutes "consent";
and (4) who qualifies as an "owner".
A. The "Conjunctive" or "Disjunctive" Debate
One of the foremost difficulties that has confronted the
courts interpreting the innocent owner defense under section 881
has been determining whether the phrase "without the knowledge
or consent of that owner"9" should follow a conjunctive or dis-
junctive meaning.
Courts adhering to the conjunctive interpretation of the inno-
cent owner defense hold that owners claiming innocence may do
so only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they
were both without knowledge of the illegal activity giving rise to
the forfeiture and did not consent to the illegal activity giving rise
to the forfeiture.9" By contrast, courts adhering to the disjunctive
88 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
89 But cf. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (1988). The innocent owner under § 881 (a) (4) (C)
(the conveyance provision) requires the owner to establish that the alleged wrongful acts
were "committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner."
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
Whereas the innocent owner provisions under both § 881(a)(6) (the ex-
change/proceeds provision) and § 8 81(a) (7) (the real property provision) provide:
[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the in-
terest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner
to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that oumer.
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6),(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
Despite the different language in these sections, the conjunctive or disjunctive de-
bate still applies. See United States v. One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir.
1992) (court discusses conjunctive/disjunctive debate in context of § 881 (a)(4)(C)).
90 See discussion supra note 89.
91 The seminal case illustrating the conjunctive approach to the innocent owner
defense is United States v. Lot 111-B, Tax Map Key, 902 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam). In Tax Map Key, the district court had found that there was probable cause that
the claimant's property was used to facilitate the commission of a narcotics violation and
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interpretation hold that owners claiming innocence may do so by
showing that they were either without knowledge of the acts giving
rise to the forfeiture or they did not consent to the acts giving rise
to forfeiture.92 Hence, under a disjunctive interpretation of the
defense, owners who had knowledge of illegal narcotics activities
could still prevent the forfeiture of their property if they could
prove that they did not "consent" to the activity. Although it is
clear that the majority of courts have favored the disjinctive ap-
was therefore forfeitable under § 881(a) (7). Id. at 1444. The claimant did not dispute
that the premises had been so used, but argued that he was an innocent owner. Id. The
district court rejected the claimant's defense because the claimant had knowledge of the
illegal activities occurring on the property. Id. at 1445. On appeal the claimant argued
that notwithstanding his knowledge of the illegal activities, he should have been entitled
to establish that he was without consent of the activities. Id. The Court of Appeals reject-
ed the claimant's argument, holding that an innocent owner must establish both lack of
knowledge and lack of consent to avoid the forfeiture of property. Id. The Tax Map Key
court reached its conclusion by pointing to the policy and legislative history behind §
881. Id. Accord United States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle, 9 F.d 74 (9th Cir. 1993).
92 The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v.
6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989), exemplifies the disjunctive approach. In
6109 Grubb Rd., the claimant's spouse was convicted of three drug felonies. Id. at 620.
Thereafter, the government sought forfeiture of property owned by the claimant and her
spouse. Although the claimant conceded that there was probable cause to believe that
her home, 6109 Grubb Road, had been used to commit or facilitate narcotics violations
(in violation of § 881(a)(7)), the claimant argued that her interest in the property
should not be forfeited because she eiter did not know of the illegal use of the property
or did not consent to the use of the property for narcotics violations. Id. The district
court entered an order of forfeiture concluding that the claimant had failed to prove
that she was without knowledge of the illegal use of the premises (the court did not
consider whether she consented to such use). Id. at 620 n.1 to 623. On appeal, the
claimant argued that despite her knowledge of the illegal activity, she should have been
provided the opportunity to establish her lack of consent to such use. Id. at 624. The
Grubb court relied on the canons of statutory construction to resolve the issue. The court
determined that these canons hold that terms connected by a disjunctive, such as the
word "or," are to be given separate meanings. The court reasoned that since the words
"knowledge" and "consent" are separated in the statute by the disjunctive "or," the court
gave the terms separate meanings. Id. at 626. Thus, the court held that the claimant
could establish innocent ownership by showing "that the illegal use of the property oc-
curred either without her knowledge or without her consent." Id. at 626.
Recognizing that the reasoning of the 6109 Grubb Rd. court may be flawed, other
courts and commentators have arrived at a disjunctive interpretation of the innocent
owner defense by different means. In United States v. 141st St. Corp. By Hersh, 911 F.2d
870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991), the court held that "in order to
consent to drug activity, one must know of it. If we were to construe section 881 (a) (7)
to mean that a claimant's knowledge alone precludes the innocent owner defense (i.e.,
that a claimant must disprove both knowledge and consent), then 'consent' as used in
the statute would be totally unnecessary." Id. at 878. Concluding that every word in a
statute should be given effect, and that the conjunctive interpretation of the innocent
owner defense would render the word "consent" superfluous, the court adhered to the
disjunctive interpretation of the defense. Id. at 878.
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proach, the debate is far from settled."
The few proponents of the conjunctive interpretation present
two rationales for their position. First, in the legislative history of
the innocent owner defense, Congress stated that "property would
not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such property
knew or consented to the fact" that the property was associated
with drug related activity."4 Courts and commentators state that,
on its face, this language indicates that either knowledge of or con-
sent to the proscribed act would result in forfeiture. Thus, the
owner must prove lack of both elements to avoid forfeiture. 5
93 It appears that the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits ad-
here to the disjunctive interpretation of the defense. United States v. 77 Walnut St., No.
90-1729, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 22457, at *12 (1st Cir. Dec. 10, 1990) (claimant utilizing
innocent owner defense under § 881(a) (7) may do so by proving "that the illegal use of
the property occurred either without her knowledge or without her consent."); United
States v. 141st St. Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) ("We conclude that
a claimant may avoid forfeiture by establishing either that he had no knowledge of the
narcotics activity or, if he had knowledge, that he did not consent to it."), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir.
1989) ("[K]nowledge of the illegal usage does not deprive the owner of an interest when
the owner can demonstrate the property was used without her consent."); United States
v. 31 Endless St., No. 92-1609, 1993 WL 441804 (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1993) (discussing
whether claimant had knowledge, and if so, whether claimant did not consent), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct 1545 (1994); United States v. 14307 Four Lakes Dr., No. 92-1585, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 18537, at *10 n.2 (6th Cir. July 13, 1993) ("Several of this Court's (un-
published) opinions make clear that either ignorance or non-consent will suffice to make
out an innocent owner defense."); United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496,
1503 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[E]ither ignorance or non-consent is sufficient to make out
an innocent owner defense."). But see United States v. Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d 1558
(11th Cir. 1993) (appearing to follow conjunctive interpretation); infira note 100.
The Ninth Circuit is the only Circuit to maintain the conjunctive interpretation.
United States v. Lot 111-B, Tax Map Key, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curi-
am). See supra note 91.
Finally, there are those courts, namely the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits which have refused to take a position regarding whether the
defense should have a conjunctive or disjunctive interpretation. United States v. Lot 9,
Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994, 1000 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The Fifth Circuit has
not taken a position, and it would be unwise for us to make Circuit law without a com-
plete record and thorough briefing of this issue."). But cf. United States v. Stop Six Cen-
ter, 781 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (recognizing the Fifth Circuit's neutral stance
then proceeding to follow the disjunctive interpretation); United States v. 7326 Highway
45 North, 965 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Seventh Circuit has not taken a posi-
tion on this issue, and we need not do so here."); United States v. 1989 Jeep Wagoneer,
976 F.2d 1172, 1174 n.1 ("We need not decide whether the claimant must prove both
lack of knowledge and consent . . ").
94 124 CONG. REC. 34670, 34671 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9496, 9522.
The court in Tax Map Key relied on this statement to conclude that congressional "policy
would be substantially undercut if persons who were fully aware of the illegal connection
or source of their property were permitted to reclaim property as 'innocent' owners." Tax
Map Key, 902 F.2d at 1445.
95 See Tax Map Key, 902 F.2d at 1445; 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 663 (Greenberg,
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Second, proponents argue that
[m]ost of the decisions holding that lack of consent [alone] is
a defense ignore the fact that the phrase "without the knowl-
edge or consent" is cast in the negative. The innocent owner
must show that the activity subjecting the property to forfeiture
was committed without his "knowledge or consent."'
Again, this indicates that the owner must prove lack of both
elements to avoid forfeiture.
Similarly, there are two rationales for adhering to the disjunc-
tive interpretation of the innocent owner defense. First, courts
adhering to this interpretation note that the canons of statutory
construction hold that terms connected by a disjunctive, such as
the word "or," are to be given separate meanings. Since the terms
"knowledge" and "consent" are separated in the innocent owner
provision by the disjunctive "or," these courts give the terms sepa-
rate meanings."
Second, some courts follow a disjunctive approach by focusing
on the word "consent" as used in the statute. These courts hold
that "in order to consent to drug activity, one must know of it. If
[courts] were to construe section 881(a)(7) to mean that a
claimant's knowledge alone precludes the innocent owner defense
(i.e., that a claimant must disprove both knowledge and consent),
then 'consent' as used in the statute would be totally unneces-
sary."98 Assuming that every word in a statute should be given
effect, these courts conclude that the conjunctive interpretation of
the innocent owner defense would render the word "consent"
J., dissenting); 141st St. Corp. By Hersh, 911 F.2d at 878 (holding for disjunctive interpreta-
tion on other grounds); Lalit KL Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property
Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 471, 483-
84 (1989); 1 SMrrH, supra note 4, 1 4.02, at 4-36.4 (stating that the conjunctive interpre-
tation "is the only one consistent with the legislative history.").
96 1 SMITH, supra note 4, 1 4.02, at 4-36.4. One commentator notes that a principle
of logic, known as De Morgan's theorem, states that "the denial of a conjunction [not A
and B] is equivalent to the alteration of the denials [not A or not B] and the denial of
an alteration [not A or B] is equivalent to the conjunction of denials [not A and not
B]." Because the innocent owner defense provides that an owner must establish that the
proscribed act was committed "without the knowledge or consent of [the] owner," it is a
denial of the an alteration. Thus, De Morgan's theorem would indicate that the owner
must be without both knowledge and consent (the conjunction of the denials) in order
to meet the innocent owner defense. Loomba, supra note 95, at 480-82.
97 See 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626; United States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F.
Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); see also discussion supra note 92. But see Loomba, supra note
95, at 480-87 (noting flaws in this reasoning).
98 141st St. Corp. By Hersh, 911 F.2d at 878.
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superfluous. Thus, the disjunctive interpretation of the defense
should be followed. 99
The Circuit Courts have adhered to one of three positions on
this issue. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Elev-
enth"° Circuits have adhered to the disjunctive interpretation.
The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits implicitly or explicitly decline to take a position on the de-
bate, while the Ninth Circuit stands alone by expressly adhering to
the conjunctive interpretation.'
A proposed amendment to section 881 attempts to alleviate
this confusion by explicitly adding a disjunctive interpretation to
section 881(a)(7)."1° Although the amendment would resolve this
conflict, it is unlikely that the confusion surrounding the innocent
owner defense would dissipate. This is so because the innocent
owner defense raises questions beyond the conjunctive or disjunc-
tive debate. For instance, what is meant by the terms "knowledge"
and "consent"? How can claimants fulfil their burden of establish-
ing one or the other"3 or both?' In addition, how should the
defense apply to post-illegal act transferees?
B. What is "Knowledge"?
What is "knowledge"? The majority view appears to be that a
99 Id. at 878; Loomba, supra note 95, at 485-87. Contra United States v. Property
Titled in the Names of Ponce, 751 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 n.3 (D. Haw. 1990) (stating that
it is possible to consent to illegal activity even where person can show lack of knowledge
of illegal activity).
100 There appears to be some confusion in the district courts as to which interpreta-
tion the Eleventh Circuit follows. The confusion was explained by one district court as
follows:
In 1991, an Eleventh Circuit panel determined that the "or" provision should be
interpreted in a conjunctive manner. United States v. 15603 85th Avenue 933 F.2d
976, 981 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Innocent owners are those who have no knowledge
of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the illegal activities."). A
year later, however, a different Eleventh Circuit panel concluded that the inno-
cent owner test should be interpreted in a disjunctive manner. United States v.
1012 Germantown Road, 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 (l1th Cir. 1992) . . . . In 1993, a
third Eleventh Circuit panel returned to the 1991 standard, stating that "Inno-
cent owners are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and who
have not consented to the illegal activities." United States v. 6960 Miraflores Ave-
nue, 995 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993).
United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 831 F. Supp. 1578, 1583 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
101 See supra notes 91, 93.
102 See H.R. 2417 supra note 85.
103 Under a disjunctive interpretation.
104 Under a conjunctive interpretation.
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claimant seeking to prevent forfeiture based upon the innocent
owner defense has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that she had no actual (subjective) knowledge of the
facts subjecting the property to forfeiture at the time she became
the owner. °5 Additionally, it appears that such actual knowledge
incorporates the concept of "willful blindness.""°  Thus, the
claimant who deliberately avoids knowledge of the act giving rise
to forfeiture by "sticking his head in the sand""0 7 will be deemed
to have actual knowledge.' 8 Courts have even held that knowl-
edge may be imputed to another."°
Contrary to the majority position, a few courts hold that the
failure to exercise due care precludes reliance on the innocent
owner defense."0 In these jurisdictions, an innocent owner who
105 See, e.g., United States v. 141st St. Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 877 (2d Cir.
1990) (upholding district court's instruction requiring claimant to prove lack of actual
knowledge), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. $10,694.00, 828 F.2d 233,
234 (4th Cir. 1987) ("There is nothing in the plain language of section 881(a)(6) re-
quiring courts to look to the objective rather than subjective knowledge of the owner
when determining whether forfeiture is proper."), overruled in part by In re 1985 Nissan,
300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317, 1320 (1989) (not effecting holding as to knowledge issue); United
States v. 14307 Four Lakes Dr., No. 92-1585, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 18537, at *10 (6th
Cir. July 13, 1993) (utilizing actual knowledge standard); United States v. 7326 Highway
45 N., 965 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The language of section 881(a)(7) constrains
courts to employ a subjective rather than an objective standard for assessing the
claimant's knowledge."); United States v. 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.
1993) (innocent owner defense does not encompass "should have known" standard).
106 In the criminal context, a person who willfully blinds herself to the facts has the
same state of mind as a person with actual knowledge of those facts. See United States v.
Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-03 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
107 United States v. 1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1987).
108 See United States v. 755 Forrest Rd., 985 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
willful blindness applies to lack of knowledge element under § 881(a)(7)); 1980 Red
Ferrari, 827 F.2d at 480 (court held that a claimant who could have avoided connection
between the illegal acts and his automobile only by "sticking his head in the sand" could
not prove lack of actual knowledge).
Thus, the "willful blindness" concept applies to all three of the primary forfeiture
sections under § 881 despite the fact that § 881(a)(4) (forfeiture of conveyances) is the
only provision which expressly provides for the "willful blindness" exception in its inno-
cent owner defense.
109 For example, knowledge may be imputed to a corporate owner, where an agent
of the corporation uses corporate property to facilitate narcotics violations. 141st St. Corp.
by Hersh, 911 F.2d at 876.
110 See United States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle, 9 F.3d 74, 76 (9th Cir. 1993)
("[I]nnocence is incompatible with knowledge that puts the owner on notice that he
should inquire further."). In 10936 Oak Run Circle the government sought forfeiture of a
drug dealer's home pursuant to § 881(a)(6) (as proceeds of illegal activity). Id. at 75.
Prior to the government's claim, however, the drug dealer had transferred title to the
home, valued at $88,000, to his girlfriend's parents (claimants). In turn, the claimants
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should have known (objective standard) of the illegal use of the
property may be deemed to have "knowledge" for the purpose of
the statute."'
C. What is "Consent"?
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,"' the United
States Supreme Court, in now-famous dicta, stated that although
the innocence of an owner is generally not a defense in to an in
rem civil forfeiture, a constitutional defense may be available if the
owner is able to prove "not only that he was uninvolved in and
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use
of his property.""' So began the "Calero-Toledo defense," a consti-
tutional defense to civil forfeiture. 4
agreed to discharge an $11,000 debt owed to them by the drug dealer. Id. Thereafter,
the claimants attempted to prevent the forfeiture of the property by stating that they
were innocent owners who were without knowledge of the illegal activities of the drug
dealer and without knowledge that the property was purchased with drug proceeds. Id. In
addressing the claimants' defense the court stated:
[T~he [claimants] were offered what appears to have been a remarkable bargain.
Should they have asked why? Did they ask why? What answers were they given?
These and other factual questions must be resolved in the district court, whose
task it will be to determine the credibility of the evidence and explanations ten-
dered by the [claimants]. Under the statute the burden is on them to "estab-
lish" their innocence.
Id. at 76. See also United States v. $215,000, 882 F.2d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 997 U.S. 1005 (1990); Contra Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d at 478 (holding that actual
knowledge is standard).
111 See supra note 110.
112 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
113 Id. at 689. In Calero-Toledo, a yacht company leased a pleasure yacht to two Puerto
Rican residents. Id. at 665. One year later, the lessees were arrested for using the yacht
to transport marijuana. Thereafter, the Puerto Rican government sought the forfeiture of
the yacht under its statute providing for the forfeiture of any conveyances (including
vessels) used "in any manner to facilitate the transportation" of illegal drugs. Id. at 665
n.1. The lessees conceded that the yacht company neither knew of nor participated in
the drug offense. Id. at 668. After reviewing the history of forfeiture and explaining that
the innocence of the owner in a forfeiture proceeding is almost uniformly rejected as a
defense, the Court stated that if an owner "proved not only that he was uninvolved in
and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could
be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property . . . it would be difficult to
conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive." Id. at
68990. See Alice M. O'Brien, Note, "Caught in the Crossfire" Protecting the Innocent Owner of
Real Property From Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 521
(1991).
114 Unlike the primary provisions of § 881(a), many civil forfeiture statutes do not
provide for statutory innocent owner defenses. Thus, under these statutes the constitution-
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Calero-Toledo is significant to this discussion because federal
courts are divided over whether this defense should be incorporat-
ed into the statutory innocent owner provisions under section 881.
In other words, it is -unclear whether proving lack of "consent"
under the innocent owner defense requires claimants to prove
that they had done all that reasonably could be expected to pre-
vent the proscribed use of their property."5
The Second Circuit, for example, held that since "Congress
has left to the courts the task of interpreting and refining the
ally based "Calero-Toledo defense" is the primary means to alleviate some of the harshness
of civil forfeiture laws.
115 See Calro-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. Many courts expressly incorporate the Calero-
Toledo standard into the statutory definition of "consent". United States v. 141 St. Corp.
by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 879 (2d Cir. 1990) ("We find the Calero-Toledo standard appropri-
ate for section 881(a) (7) forfeiture cases . . . ."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Unit-
ed States v. 31 Endless St., No. 92-1609, 1993 WL 441804, at *3 (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1993)
("Consent, for the purposes of section 881(a)(7), is 'the failure to take all reasonable
steps to prevent illicit use of premises once one acquires knowledge of that use . . .'");
United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
the Calero-Toledo standard applicable to both §§ 881(a)(6),(7)).
Other courts, however, have expressly rejected the incorporation of Calero-Toledo into
the statutory innocent owner defense. United States v. 1 St. A-1, 865 F.2d 427, 430 (1st
Cir. 1989) (application of Calero-Toledo to statutory innocent owner defense "seems inap-
posite."); United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14, & 15, 869 F.2d 942, 947 (6th Cir. 1989)
("[Tihe statute with which we are concerned imposes no requirement that a person who
claims the status of an 'innocent owner' establish [the Calero-Toledo standard]."); United
States v. 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172, 1175 (8th Cir. 1992) (Calero-Toledo is consti-
tutional doctrine that has no place in statutory innocent owner analysis under §
881 (a) (4)).
Other courts leave the application of the doctrine to the district courts. United
States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 627 (3d Cir. 1989) ("What, if any, applicability
the following dictum in [Calero-Toledo] has to the innocent owner defense will be for the
district court to decide . . . ."); United States v. $47,875.00, 746 F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir.
1984) ("[W]e leave the question of the applicability of the Calero-Toledo dicta . . . for
another day."); United States v. 7326 Highway 45 N., 965 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[W]e need not decide whether consent is determined by subjective or objective crite-
ia."); United States v. Property Titied in the Names of Ponce, 751 F.. Supp. 1436, 1440-
41 (D. Haw. 1990) (recognizing Calero-Toledo as the appropriate standard despite Ninth
Circuit's failure to address issue).
Even the commentators disagree as to the application of Calero-Toledo and the statu-
tory innocent owner defense. For a discussion favoring the incorporation of the Calero-
Toledo standard into the statutory innocent owner defense, see generally Loomba, supra
note 95, at 489-90; Eric G. Zajac, Tenancies By The Entirety and Federal Civil Forfeiture Under
the Crime Abuse Prevention and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, 54 U. PIrr. L REV. 553, 577
(1993). For a contrary view arguing that Caler-Toledo'should not be incorporated into the
innocent owner defense, see generally O'Brien, supra note 113; Arthur G. Crabtree, Com-
ment, Seizure of Third Party's Property Associated With Drug Money: Requiring Third Parties To
Become Private Police?, 23 Sw. U. L. REv. 79, 95 (1993).
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term 'consent,'""6 a landlord attempting to establish his lack of
consent to the use of his property for illegal drug-related activities
would have to prove that he did all that reasonably could be ex-
pected to stop the illegal use once he learned it was occurring.
11 7
The court reasoned that consent "must be something more than a
state of mind," due to the "ever increasing toll" that the sale and
use of drugs has had on our nation.'
Other courts, such as the Sixth Circuit have expressly rejected
the incorporation of Calero-Toledo into the statutory innocent own-
er defense."9 These courts have generally held that Calero-Toledo
is irrelevant to interpreting section 881 because Calero-Toledo is a
constitutionally based defense, whereas section 881 is a statutory
defense. Additionally, these courts have recognized that when
enacting section 881, Congress was aware of Calero-Toledo and
would have either specifically placed such language in the statute
or made an explicit reference to the standard had it wished to
incorporate the standard."' Unfortunately, most courts which re-
ject the Calero-Toledo "consent" standard fall to offer any guidance
as to what lack of consent means.
Currently, the Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits expressly
incorporate the Calero-Toledo standard into the statutory definition
of consent. The First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits expressly reject
the incorporation of the Calero-Toledo standard, while the Third,
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits
either fail to address the issue or leave the application of Calero-
Toledo to the district courts.1
21
D. Who Qualifies as an "Owner"?
In order to raise the innocent owner defense, one must have
standing to do so. The general rule is that "only 'owners' have
standing to contest a forfeiture proceeding under section 881. "I
Not surprisingly, who qualifies as an "owner" has great significance
116 141st St. Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d at 879.
117 Id. at 878-79.
118 Id. at 879.
119 See Lots 12, 13, 14 & 15, 869 F.2d 942.
120 See id. at 946-47; see also Zajac, supra note 115, at 95.
121 See supra note 115. For an annotated discussion of the innocent owner defense,
see generally Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Who is Exempt From Forfeiture of Drug Proceeds
Under "Innocent Owner" Provision of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), 109 A.L.R. FED. 322 (1992);
Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Who is Exempt From Forfeiture of Drug Proceeds Under "Innocent
Owner" Provision of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7), 110 A.L.R. FED. 569 (1992).
122 United States v. $38,570, 950 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 1992).
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to many claimants. Courts have generally held that an "owner" is
someone who possesses more than mere legal title to the forfeited
property. In sum, the claimant must have the right to exercise do-
minion and control over the property." Thus, "straw" owners
holding nominal title to forfeitable property lack standing to de-
fend the property from forfeiture.24 Prior to 1993, however,
many claimants were being denied standing to raise the innocent
owner defense notwithstanding that they exercised sufficient con-
trol over the forfeitable property. These claimants were victims of
the pre-1993 interpretation of the "relation-back doctrine" under
21 U.S.C. § 881(h).
Section 881(h) provides that "[a]ll right, title, and interest in
property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in
the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to
forfeiture under this section. " " Prior to 1993, lower courts were
split on whether the innocent owner defense was available to an
owner who acquired a post-illegal act interest in the property.
Under a strict interpretation of the provision, some courts rea-
soned that since title to the forfeited property vested in the Unit-
ed States "upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfei-
ture," the drug dealer never owned the property and thus could
not pass tide to an innocent third party. Under this reasoning, no
one who acquired rights in the property subsequent to the illegal
activity giving rise to the forfeiture could ever constitute an "own-
er" of the property. Consequently, any subsequent donees,
lienholders or purchasers of the property could not utilize the
123 See, e.g., $38,570, 950 F.2d at 1112 ("[A] bare assertion of ownership of the re%
without more, is inadequate to prove an ownership interest sufficient to establish stand-
ing."); United States v. Lot 111-, Tax Map Key, 902 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam) (quoting United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 630 (11th Cir.
1986)) ("The claimant in a forfeiture action has the burden of showing that he owns or
has an interest in the forfeited property . . . . '[P]ossession of mere legal title by one
who does not exercise dominion and control over the property is insufficient even to
establish standing to challenge a forfeiture.'").
124 See United States v. Contents of Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-07143 at
Merrill Lynch, 971 F.2d 974, 984-87 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1580 (1993).
125 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
126 See In re 1985 Nissan, 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317, 1320 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
("[N]o third party can acquire a legally valid interest in the property forfeited from any-
one other than the government after the illegal act takes place."). But cf Eggleston v.
Colorado, 873 F.2d 242, 247 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[A] judgment of forfeiture relates back
to the time of the unlawful act . . . . Forfeiture therefore cuts off the rights of subse-
quent lienholders or purchasers, subject to the so-called innocent owners excep-
tion .. . .").
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innocent owner defense, thereby rendering the property held by
post-illegal act transferees who had no knowledge or consent of
the illegal activity automatically forfeitable to the government.
12 7
Hence, prior to 1993, few courts had to reconcile the innocent
owner defense with the rights of those persons who acquired an
interest in forfeitable property after the underlying illegal activity.
In 1993, however, the Supreme Court, in United States v. 92 Buena
Vista Avenue,1 28 drastically altered the interrelation between the
innocent owner defense and the relation-back doctrine thereby
creating a new context for the application of the innocent owner
defense."
V. PROTECTING POST-ILLEGAL ACT TRANSFEREES & THE DONEES
OF FORFEITABLE -PROPERY: UNrTED STATES V. 92 BUENA VISTA AVENUE
In its last two terms, the Supreme Court has rendered no less
than four decisions which have major implications for civil forfei-
ture law."' In United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,' the
Court granted the protection of the innocent owner defense to
the donees of forfeitable property. Additionally, the Court stated
that the government may no longer utilize the relation-back doc-
trine to deprive donees and post-illegal act transferees the oppor-
tunity to raise the innocent owner defense. Unfortunately, howev-
er, the Court declined the opportunity to clarify the confines of
the innocent owner defense in relation to these claimants.
A. Statement of Facts and Procedural History
Joseph Anthony Brenna made a gift of $240,000 to his girl-
friend, Beth Ann Goodwin.32 Ms. Goodwin used this money to
purchase a home, 92 Buena Vista Avenue, Rumson, New Jersey,
where she resided with her children.'33 The District Court of
New Jersey determined that there was probable cause to believe
127 See 1985 Nissan, 300ZX 889 F.2d at 320. Many courts did permit the innocent
owner defense to override the relation-back doctrine where the claimant had given value
for the property. See, e.g United States v. Lake Forrest Circle, 870 F.2d 586, 590 n.11
(llth Cir. 1989). 92 Buena Vista Ave., however, rendered the interpretation of the rela-
tion-back provision to apply similarly to all claimants, including donees.
128 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion).
129 See discussion infra Part V.
130 See cases cited supra note 4.
131 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (plurality opinion).




that the funds used to buy the house were the proceeds of illegal
drug trafficking of Mr. Brenna."s Accordingly, the government
seized the premises pursuant to section 881(a) (6), but allowed Ms.
Goodwin to remain in possession of the premises pending the
outcome of the forfeiture action."3 5 Ms. Goodwin subsequently
filed a claim in the District Court of New Jersey and moved for
summary judgment, claiming that she was unaware of Mr.
Brenna's drug activities and therefore exempt from the forfeiture
pursuant to the innocent owner defense under section
881 (a) (6)."s6
The district court denied Ms. Goodwin's motion, holding that
Ms. Goodwin could not invoke the innocent owner defense for
two reasons: First, it ruled that "the innocent owner defense may
only be invoked by those who can demonstrate that they are bona
fide purchasers for value."'37 Thus, because the property subject
to forfeiture was a gift, Ms. Goodwin did not have standing to
invoke the innocent owner defense. Second, the court held that
the innocent owner defense applied only to persons who acquire
an interest in the property before the acts giving rise to the forfei-
ture occurred.s Ms. Goodwin was permitted to take an interloc-
utory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court, holding that Ms. Goodwin could assert the innocent
owner defense under section 881(a)(6)."' The Third Circuit re-
fused to limit the innocent owner defense to bona fide purchasers
for value because (1) the plain language of the statute contains
no such limitation; (2) the legislative history indicates that the
term "owner" should be broadly construed; and (3) the difference
between the text of section 881(a)(6) and the text of the criminal
forfeiture statute, which limits the defense to bona fide purchas-
134 Id. The forfeiture proceeding was brought by the government as a consequence
of an indictment alleging that Joseph Anthony Brenna engaged in a continuing criminal
enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, engaged in a conspiracy to import more than
1,000 kilograms of marijuana into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, and
knowingly imported in excess of 1,000 kilograms of marijuana into the United States in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,
937 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1991), affid, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion).
135 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (1993) (plurality opin-
ion).
136 Id. at 1130.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1131.
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ers, evidenced congressional intent not to restrict the civil section
in the same manner. 4°
Further, the Third Circuit rejected the government's relation-
back argument. The government had argued, pursuant to section
881(h), that Ms. Goodwin could never have been an "owner" of
the premises because at the time of the drug transactions, all
right, title, and interest in the proceeds from the drug transactions
vested in the United States. 4' The Third Circuit concluded that
the relation-back doctrine applied only to "property described in
subsection (a) [section 881(a)]" and that the property at issue
would not fit into that description if the respondent (Ms.
Goodwin) could first establish her innocent owner defense."'
Thus, under the Third Circuit's interpretation of the relation-
back doctrine, a court would have to ascertain whether the inno-
cent owner defense in section 881(a)(6) was applicable before
applying the relation-back provision. In addition, even if the
government's interest vested upon the commission of the illegal
act, it could not attach under section 881(h) to property exempt-
ed from forfeiture under section 881(a) because section 881(a)
preempted section 881(h). The court stated that any other inter-
pretation of section 881(h) "would essentially serve to emasculate
the innocent owner defense provided for in section 881(a). No
one obtaining property after the occurrence of a drug transaction,
including a bona fide purchaser for value, would be eligible to
offer an innocent owner defense on his behalf."' The Third
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine
"whether [Ms. Goodwin] was, in fact, an innocent owner."'"
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a 6-3 decision.'
1. The Plurality
Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens"'6 first summarily
140 Id
141 See discussion supra Part IV.D.
142 92 Buena Irzsta Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1131.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 92 Buena rsta Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (plurality opinion).
146 Justices Blackmun, O'Conner and Souter joined in the plurality opinion.
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held that "[t]he Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
protection afforded to innocent owners is not limited to bona fide
purchasers."1 47 As a result, donees of forfeitable property may
challenge a forfeiture under the statutory innocent owner defense.
Justice Stevens reasoned that the text of section 881(a)(6) used
the term "owner" three times without qualification.14 Hence,
such language was "sufficiently unambiguous to foreclose any con-
tention that it applies only to bona fide purchasers." '149 Thus, the
fact that the funds used by Ms. Goodwin to purchase her home
were a gift did not disqualify her from raising the innocent owner
defense under section 881(a)(6).
The plurality next addressed the relation-back provision in
section 881(h). Justice Stevens refuted the government's relation-
back argument that Ms. Goodwin had never been the owner of
the home because section 881(h) had vested ownership in the
United States at the moment when the proceeds of the illegal
drug transaction were used to pay the purchase price. First, Justice
Stevens cited Chief Justice John Marshall for the proposition that
"under the common-law rule the fictional and retroactive vesting
was not self-executing."' Justice Stevens reasoned that should
the government win a judgment of forfeiture, the vesting of its
title in the property relates back to the moment when the proper-
ty became forfeitable. Until the government does win such a judg-
ment, however, someone else owns the property and may invoke
any defense available to the owner before the forfeiture is de-
creed.'
Second, Justice Stevens reasoned that even if the common law
rules of retroactive vesting were inapplicable, 5 the text of sec-
tion 881(a) (6) still supported extending the innocent owner de-
fense to property interests obtained after the act giving rise to
147 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134.
148 Id.
149 Id
150 Id. at 1135.
It has been proved, that in all forfeitures accruing at common law, nothing vests
in the government until some legal step shall be taken for the assertion of its
right, after which, for many purposes, the doctrine of relation carries back the
title to the commission of the offense.
Id. (quoting United States v. Grundy, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 337, 350-51 (1806)).
151 Id. at 1136.
152 Justice Stevens implied that since the common law rule "was never applied to the
forfeiture of proceeds, and because the statute now contains an innocent owner defense,
it may not be immediately clear that they lead to the same result" Id.
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forfeiture. Justice Stevens explained that the relation-back provi-
sion of section 881(h) only applies to "property described under
subsection (a) [section 881(a)].""I Since subsection (a) itself,
contains the innocent owner defense, courts must first determine
whether the property is exempt from subsection (a) before the
relation-back provision applies." 4 Therefore, the Court concluded
that Ms. Goodwin was entitled to a hearing on her innocent own-
er defense before the government moved to procure a forfeiture
order, even though she was a donee who obtained her interest in
the home after the alleged illegal activity had occurred.
1 5
As a "postscript," Justice Stevens identified, but failed to de-
cide an issue regarding the statutory construction of the innocent
owner defense: Whether a post-illegal act claimant (a claimant who
acquired an interest in forfeitable property after the illegal activity
had occurred) must show that she was without knowledge of the
illegal act at the time it occurred, or at the time of the transfer.
Although the Court declined to resolve the issue, Justice Stevens
observed that "equitable doctrines may foreclose the assertion of
an innocent owner defense by a party with guilty knowledge of the
tainted character of the property."
5 6
2. The Concurrence
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment,57 disagreed with
the plurality's reasoning. Justice Scalia explained that the relation-
back provision under section 881(h) merely codified the common
law relation-back doctrine. "' Justice Scalia stated that the
plurality's position regarding the relationship between section
881(a) (6) and section 881(h) was based on faulty premises. Rath-
er, Justice Scalia obtained a similar result by reading section
881(h) as an expression of the traditional common law relation-
back doctrine which holds that retroactive vesting of title operates
only on the judicial order of forfeiture. According to Justice Scalia,
while section 881(h) says that title "shall vest in the United States
upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture," section
881(h) really means that title "shall vest in the United States upon
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1136-37
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1137.
157 Justice Thomas joined in the concurring opinion.
158 92 Buena Irsta Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1138 (Scalia, J., concurring).
[Vol. 70:2
9OTE-CIVIL FORFEITURE
Ujudicial order of] forfeiture, effective as of commission of the act
giving rise to forfeiture. ""' Thus, as owner of the property sub-
ject to, but not yet ordered for forfeiture, Ms. Goodwin should
have been afforded the opportunity to raise the innocent owner
defense.
3. The Dissent
Justice Kennedy," ° severely criticized the plurality. He stated
that "[o]nce this case left the District Court, the appellate courts
and all counsel began to grapple with the wrong issue."' 6' Justice
Kennedy insisted that the determinative issue in the case was not
the proper application of the relation-back doctrine to a donee
holding a post-crime interest in property, but rather whether such
a donee could ever obtain a superior interest in the property
sufficient to defeat a forfeiture order.162 Justice Kennedy stated
that under the principles established by the laws of voidable title,
"one who acquires property from a holder of voidable title other
than by a good faith purchase for value obtains nothing beyond
what the transferor held.""es Justice Kennedy reasoned that since
the transferor of drug proceeds could not assert the innocent
owner defense, neither could a donee who has given no value.
Simply stated, the donee, having provided no value to eliminate
the defect in title, merely stands in the shoes of the donor.
Hence, Ms. Goodwin, a mere donee, could not allege rights that
Mr. Brenna, an alleged drug dealer, could not assert." By deny-
ing this principle, Justice Kennedy argued that "the plurality
rip[ped] out the most effective enforcement provisions in all of
the drug forfeiture laws." "
159 Id. at 1140.
160 Chief Justice Renquist and Justice White joined in the dissenting opinion.
161 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1144.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1146. For a thorough review of the facts and holdings of 92 Buena Vista
Ave., see generally Moshe Heching, Civil Forfeiture and the Innocent Owner Defense: United
States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993), 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 835,
848 (1993) (praising the Court for "temper[ing] our pursuit of drug offenders with an
equally zealous protection of personal rights."); see also J. William Snyder, Jr., Reining in
Civil Forfeiture Law and Protecting Innocent Owners frnn Civil Asset Forfeiture: United States v.
92 Buena Vista Avenue, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1332, 1365 (1994) ("92 Buena Vista Avenue im-
poses a long overdue restraint on federal civil forfeiture law ... ."). For a discussion on
the ambiguities created by 92 Buena Vista Ave., see generally Michael D. Dautrich, Note,
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In sum, 92 Buena Vista Avenue essentially held that (1) the
innocent owner defense is not limited to bona fide purchasers,
but may apply to donees; and (2) the statutory relation-back doc-
trine vests ownership of forfeitable property in the government
only after the entry of a final order of forfeiture rather than vest-
ing title in the government at the moment of the illegal acts.
The ramifications of this holding are best understood when it
is recalled" that prior to 92 Buena Vista Avenue, a strict interpre-
tation of the relation-back doctrine rendered it likely that owner-
ship never vested in property given or transferred to post-illegal
act transferees because ownership of the property had already
vested in the United States at the moment of the illegal act.
Therefore, 92 Buena Vista Avenue creates a dilemma in that the
innocent owner defense must now be interpreted in the context
of certain claimants (namely, post-illegal act transferees) whose
interests may not have been considered when the various courts
formulated their Circuit's interpretation of the innocent owner
defense. Applying the majority interpretation of the defense will
not only cause more judicial confusion, but it will also create a po-
tentially damaging loophole in forfeiture law.
VI. RECONCILING THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE IN LIGHT OF
INCONSISTENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND
UNITED STATES V. 92 BUENA VISTA AvENuE
It is apparent that the innocent owner defense under section
881 has been plagued by inconsistent judicial interpretation.67
But equally disturbing is the confusion that will arise when the
current interpretations of the defense are applied in the context
of 92 Buena Vista Avenue--in particular, the application of the de-
fense to post-illegal act transferees. Current application of the
defense not only renders it likely, that identically situated property
owners will receive severely different treatment, but also provides
drug dealers with an ideal method to shelter their ill-gotten assets.
A. Inconsistent Judicial Interpretation
Judicial interpretation of the phrase "without the knowledge
The "Innocent Owner" Defense in Civil Drug Forfeitures After United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Avenue: Still an Uphill Battle for Third-Party Claimants, 3 J. PUB. L. 995 (1994).
166 See discussion supra Part IV.D.
167 See discussion supra Part IV.A-D.
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or consent of that owner " " has been anything but
consistent. 169 As a result of this inconsistent judicial interpreta-
tion, two identically situated claimants can receive severely differ-
ent treatment under the defense. 7 The problem is best illustrat-
ed by example.
Consider a land owner who owns a building which is located
in one of the most drug-infested neighborhoods in a city. The
land owner has actual knowledge that his building is used for ille-
gal drug activities, yet he takes only a few minor steps to prevent
such use. As a result of the illegal activity on the premises, the
government brings a forfeiture action against the property pur-
suant to section 881 (a) (7).
Unfortunately for the land owner, his rights as an innocent
owner depend upon the jurisdiction in which the forfeiture action
is brought. If the property is located within the Sixth Circuit
(which follows the disjunctive interpretation requiring claimant to
prove either lack of actual knowledge or lack of non-Calero-Toledo
consent), 72 the claimant could possibly prevail on the innocent
owner defense. The claimant could admit to his knowledge of the
illegal activity, yet argue that he did not consent to such activity,
as illustrated by the few overt actions that he had taken to prevent
the illegal activity. However, if this same land owner was defending
property located in the Eleventh Circuit, (which follows the dis-
junctive interpretation requiring claimants to prove either lack of
actual knowledge or that they did all that reasonably could be
expected to stop the use),' 7 it is unlikely that the owner would
prevail on the defense. Although the owner could admit to his
knowledge of the activity, he would be unable to fulfill the Calero-
Toledo consent standard by proving that he did all that could rea-
sonably be expected to prevent the illegal use. Further, had this
claimant been defending property located in the Ninth Circuit
(which follows the conjunctive interpretation of the defense), 74
the claimant's mere knowledge of the activity would preclude
168 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6),(7) (1988). See also supra Part IV.
169 See discussion supra Part IV.
170 See discussion supra Part IV.
171 This example is similar to the facts of two district court cases out of New York.
See generally United States v. Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); United States
v. 710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
172 See supra notes 93, 105, 115 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 93, 105, 115.
174 See supra notes 93, 105, 115.
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victory under the innocent owner defense. Thus, in three different
jurisdictions the same land owner would receive disparate treat-
ment by the courts applying the same innocent owner defense.
Modifying the example further portrays the potential absurdi-
ties. Assume now that our land owner acquired knowledge of il-
legal activity on his property and thereafter took extensive steps at
great personal expense and risk to prevent the illegal activity. If
the forfeiture action was brought in the Sixth or Eleventh Circuits,
the land owner would likely prevail on the innocent owner de-
fense. The land owner could prove that despite his knowledge of
the illegal use of the property, he did not "consent" (under either
the Calero-Toledo or the non-Calero-Toledo standard for consent) to
such use. However, if this same property owner was in the Ninth
Circuit (conjunctive interpretation), he would still fail to meet his
burden of proving both lack of knowledge or consent to the ille-
gal use of the property, and the property would be forfeited to
the government. The inequities are obvious.
Finally, consider the defense in the context of two identically
situated land owners who live in two different jurisdictions. A land
owner in the Sixth Circuit who knew of illegal activities on her
property but took only a few steps to prevent such use can receive
the benefit of the innocent owner defense. In contrast, a land
owner in the Ninth Circuit who has the mere "objective" knowl-
edge of the illegal activities, yet has done everything in her power
to prevent the activities, would be denied the benefit of the de-
fense. In addition, these examples fail to illustrate that if these
land owners were defending property in the Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, Tenth or D.C. Circuits, they would have very little guid-
ance as to the application of the defense. Thus, claimants in these
jurisdictions are left to guess on what their rights may be.
The inconsistency in the interpretation of the innocent owner
defense creates a climate which defies a principle of justice-that
similarly situated litigants (or claimants) should receive similar
treatment under the law. Moreover, this inconsistent interpretation
"creates a general air of uncertainty" 5 surrounding civil forfei-
ture law which further exacerbates the problem. 6
175 Kirsten M. Dunne, Legislative Reform, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property
Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act: Does Knoledge Equal Consent?, 20 J.
LEGIS. 81, 83 (1994).
176 As one commentator noted:
In the absence of more definitive authority, residents of the "majority" circuits
cannot rest assured that they will have the continuing benefit of the current
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This is not the only flaw of current interpretations of the
innocent owner defense. Courts have also failed to consider the
application of the innocent owner defense to the unique position
of the post-illegal act transferee.
B. Failure to Reconcile the Innocent Owner Defense
and the Post-Illegal Act Transferee
The majority of courts and commentators"' maintain that
the disjunctive interpretation of the innocent owner defense is the
most equitable for claimants." This Note agrees that owners
who acquire knowledge that their property is being used to facili-
tate illegal drug activity should be given the opportunity to act
upon that knowledge. 79 Thus, landlords who learn of illegal
drug activity on their property, or claimants who learn that their
spouse or child is selling drugs out of the family home should be
given the opportunity to do all that is reasonably possible to pre-
vent such activity.' Accordingly, for the majority of situations,
standard .... The uncertainty also encourages those circuits which have not
committed to one side to remain neutral.
Id. at 83.
Furthermore, another potential consequence of inconsistent judicial interpretation is
that the government is likely to "venue-shop," by attempting to bring a forfeiture action
in the most favorable jurisdiction. Thus, if the government has the option of bringing a
forfeiture action in either the Ninth Circuit or the Sixth Circuit, there is no question
that the government would bring the action in the Ninth Circuit (to obtain the benefit
of the conjunctive interpretation of the defense). For a recent discussion of jurisdiction
of civil forfeiture actions, see United States v. 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, No. 92-
15350, 1994 WL 528447 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994).
177 See supra Part MA
178 See supra note 93.
179 One commentator noted the potential unfairness of the conjunctive interpretation
as follows:
The correct interpretation as a matter of policy favors establishing innocence ei-
ther by lack of knowledge or by lack of consent. Forfeiture upon knowledge
alone can lead to an unconscionable result if the owner acquires knowledge of
illegal use but has no reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to governmental
seizure. If, for example, a landlord is informed by a tenant in a multi-unit apart-
ment building that another tenant is selling crack cocaine out of his apartment,
and the landlord quickly begins to investigate the allegation, he could see his
interest in the building immediately forfeitable upon seizure whether he has had
any chance to contact the authorities. A similar result would occur with a wife
who finds out for the first time that her husband is selling drugs from the mari-
tal home but who has no real opportunity to act on that knowledge before sei-
zure.
Zajac, supra note 115, at 571.
180 See supra note 179.
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the disjunctive approach to the innocent owner defense combined
with the Calero-Toledo consent standard is the most equitable. 1'
While the disjunctive interpretation of the innocent owner defense
is appropriate for the majority of claimants, it is inappropriate for
one type of claimant-the post-illegal act transferee.
A post-illegal act transferee is a person who obtains an inter-
est in property after the commission of the illegal activities which
subjected the property to forfeiture. For example, in 92 Buena
Vista Avenue, Ms. Goodwin was a post-illegal act transferee because
she did not hold an interest in the forfeitable proceeds given to
her until long after the illegal activity had occurred. Therefore,
Ms. Goodwin could potentially have had no knowledge of the
illegal activity at the time it occurred but may have acquired such
knowledge at or before the time she obtained an interest, in the
property.
This Note contends that the current disjunctive interpretation
of the innocent owner defense is inappropriate for post-illegal act
transferees because it creates a major loophole in forfeiture law. If
the disjunctive interpretation of the innocent owner defense is
applied to a claimant who acquires a post-illegal act interest in
property, the claimant would be permitted to raise the lack of
consent defense to the forfeiture despite clear evidence that the
claimant had knowledge that the property derived from or facili-
tated illegal drug activities. As a result, claimants who did not have
knowledge of the illegal activity at the moment the illegal activity
occurred, but who obtained knowledge at or before the time the
181 This Note favors the disjunctive interpretation combined with the Calero-Toledo
consent standard based solely on the grounds of fairness. Although a few courts similarly
justify their positions on these matters on the basis of fairness, many courts and com-
mentators look solely to the technicalities of language to determine their position. See
discussion supra Part IV.
Recall that in United States v. 141st St. Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991), the court adhered to a disjunctive interpretation
of the innocent owner defense and the Calero-Toledo standard for consent. See supra notes
92-93. The court held that this combination provides:
[A] balance between the two congressional purposes of making drug trafficking
prohibitively expensive for the property owner and preserving the property of an
innocent owner. A claimant with knowledge of the illegal use to which his prop-
erty is put may defend on the basis of lack of consent, but consent in this situa-
tion must be something more than a state of mind.
Id. at 879.
This Note agrees with this balanced approach to the innocent owner defense where
the claimant is a pre-illegal act owner of the property subject to forfeiture. However, this
approach is inappropriate for the post-illegal act transferee.
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property was transferred to them, could always meet their burden
under the innocent owner defense. This is so because claimants
could always admit that they had knowledge of the illegal activity,
but that they did not "consent" to the activity. Claimants could
merely argue that "consent" was impossible under the majority or
minority interpretation of the term. It is impossible to do all that
is reasonably possible to prevent the illegal use" of property,
because claimants have no control or knowledge of the activity at
the time it occurred.
Hence, if the disjunctive interpretation of the innocent owner
defense were to apply to such post-illegal act transferees, drug
dealers would have every incentive to keep the specific details of
illegal drug activities from certain persons close to them. The deal-
ers could then transfer property to those persons who may know
(at the time of transfer) that the property is derived from or facil-
itated illegal activity, but who were in no position to prevent such
activity. These transferees would provide an ideal shelter for illicit
drug proceeds and facilitative property. The incentive for drug
dealers to take such action is particularly present in light of 92
Buena Vista Avenue, which permits donees of forfeitable property to
raise the innocent owner defense. One of the few cases to consid-
er the issue of the applicability of the innocent owner defense to
post-illegal act transferees occurred in the district court for the
Southern District of Florida."s
In United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th Street,'84 Reinaldo Luis used
his home to facilitate a narcotics conspiracy.85 Thereafter, Luis
was arrested and formally charged with conspiracy to import co-
caine. 86 The United States Magistrate held a pre-trial hearing
182 See supra Part IV.C. (discussing Calero-Toledo standard of "consent").
183 United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 831 F. Supp. 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1993). The 6640
S.W. 48th St. court noted that the innocent owner defense had rarely been applied to
post-illegal act transferees, as opposed to pre-illegal act owners. The court stated that one
of the primary reasons for the deficiency in case law was that prior to United States v.
92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion), courts had adopted a
strict interpretation of the relation-back doctrine, and therefore "routinely denied the
innocent owner claims advanced by post-illegal act transferees." Id. at 1582. See also supra
Part 1V.D, V. (discussing relation-back doctrine pre and post-92 Buena Vista Ave.).
184 831 F. Supp. 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
185 The government met its burden of showing probable cause that the property was
used to facilitate illegal narcotics activity under § 881(7) by establishing that "in Luis'
presence at the defendant property, one of Luis' associates offered a $15,000 cash depos-
it to the confidential informants to entice them to travel to Aruba to obtain over 1500
kilograms of cocaine." Id. at 1580.
186 Id.
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wherein the court, in the presence of Luis' attorney, was informed
of the conspiratorial meetings that took place at Luis' home.
8 7
Later that day, Luis executed a promissory note and a mortgage
deed to his home to his lawyer, Jose Larraz, Sr.l" A short time
later, Luis was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and the
government filed a civil forfeiture action against Luis' home pursu-
ant to section 881 (a) (7).189 Luis' lawyer filed a claim against his
interest in the home as an innocent owner under section
881 (a) (7).19O The lawyer stipulated that he had "knowledge" of
the government's allegations concerning the illegal use of the
property at the time the property was transferred to him. 9' How-
ever, the lawyer stated that he qualified as an innocent owner be-
cause "[h]e did not have any knowledge of Luis' illegal use of the
defendant property at the time that Luis engaged in the illegal activity,
and . .. [i]f he did have knowledge of any unlawful use of the
property, he did not consent to [such use]."'92 In addressing the
lawyer-claimant's arguments, the court was confronted with two
issues:
(1) Whether the innocent owner test should be applied to the
claimant's state of mind at the time of the underlying criminal
activity, or at the time that the claimant acquires the property;
and (2) Whether the issue of consent applies to an analysis of
the innocent owner status of a post-illegal act transferee. 9
First, the 6640 S. W. 48th Street court agreed with the plurality
in the 92 Buena Vista Avenue case which had suggested (in dicta)
that the appropriate time to consider a claimant's lack of knowl-
edge is at the time of the transfer of the property rather than the
187 Id.
188 The transfer process occurred as follows: "Luis executed a warranty deed ...
transferring his interest in the defendant property to Mendicuti, the co-owner of the
defendant property. Mendicuti then executed a promissory note payable to Larraz, Sr.,
and a mortgage deed, both in the amount of $50,000.00 in favor of Larraz, Sr." Id. at
1580.
189 Id.
190 A default judgment was entered against Mendicuti (the owner of record of the
property), because she failed to file a claim against the property. Id.
191 Although Luis' lawyer, Larraz, Sr., was not present at the pre-trial hearing where-
in the court provided "knowledge" of the illegal use of the forfeited property, Larraz,
Sr.'s son/law partner was at the hearing. Thereafter, Larraz, Sr. stipulated that he was
aware of the allegations of the illegal use of the property prior to obtaining an interest
in the property. Id.
192 Id. at 1582 (emphasis added).
193 Id. (emphasis added).
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time of the illegal act.' The 6640 S.W. 48th Street court stated
that considering a claimant's knowledge at the time of the illegal
act would encourage "[c]riminals [to] simply keep friends and
family 'out of the loop' when committing crimes, so that these
persons could later serve as post-illegal act transferees without
knowledge of the underlying crimes,"95 thereby avoiding the for-
feiture of the property.
Second, the court addressed the issue of consent as applied to
post-illegal act transferees.'96 The court stated that "[c]onsent is
simply irrelevant when examining the innocent owner claims of
post-illegal act transferees,"97 because a post-illegal act claimant's
innocence under a consent standard is "a foregone conclu-
sion."9' In particular, the court emphasized that persons who
did not have knowledge of the illegal acts at the moment they oc-
curred could not possibly "consent" to such illegal acts.' The
court stated that even if claimants subsequently learn of the illegal
acts, they could not possibly consent to acts that had already oc-
curred."° The 6640 S.W. 48th Street court was able to avoid the
possible application of the disjunctive interpretation of the inno-
cent owner defense by holding that the conjunctive/disjunctive
debate concerns only the pre-illegal act owners.
In sum, the court implicitly held that when courts interpret
the innocent owner defense, they should first distinguish between
pre-illegal act owners and post-illegal act transferees. If the claim-
ant is a pre-illegal act owner, the court should simply follow the
circuit's interpretation of the innocent owner defense."' Thus, if
the circuit adheres to the disjunctive interpretation, the claimant
should be permitted to prove either lack of knowledge or lack of
consent to the illegal activities. If the claimant is a post-illegal act
transferee, however, the court should limit a claimant's use of the
innocent owner defense to proving lack of knowledge. In other
words, claimants who are post-illegal act transferees are precluded
from proving that (despite their knowledge), they did not consent
to the illegal activity. The 6640 S.W. 48th Street court appropriately
194 Id. at 1583. See also supra note 156 and accompanying text.
195 6640 SW. 48th St., 831 F. Supp. at 1584.
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concluded by stating that "[tihis Court simply cannot allow post-
illegal act transferees with post-illegal act knowledge of prior illegal
activities to take advantage of a linguistic loophole in the innocent
"202owner provision.
This Note agrees with the analysis of the 6640 S.W. 48th Street
court. Until the legislature amends section 881, the innocent own-
er defense should be judicially interpreted in accordance with
6640 S.W 48th Street.
Finally, in addition to the common sense inapplicability of the
"consent" standard of the innocent owner defense to post-illegal
act transferees, the legislative history of the defense supports the
position that knowledge alone precludes the post-illegal act trans-
feree from prevailing on the defense.2 - Further, the 92 Buena
Vista Avenue case itself recognized that "equitable doctrines may
foreclose the assertion of an innocent owner defense by a party
with guilty knowledge of the tainted character of the proper-
ty."
204
Accordingly, based on common sense, the reasoning of 6640
S.W. 48th Street, and the legislative history of section 881, courts
should uphold the "equitable doctrine" of precluding the applica-
tion of the disjunctive interpretation of the innocent owner de-
fense to post-illegal act transferees. Courts can achieve this goal by
distinguishing between post-illegal act transferees and pre-illegal
202 Id. at 1586.
203 Specifically, Congress noted that:
[T]he original language [of § 881(a)(6)] could have been construed to reach
properties traceable to the illegal proceeds but obtained by an innocent party
without knowledge of the manner in which the proceeds were obtained. The origi-
nal language is modified in the proposed [innocent owner] amendments in
order to protect the individual who obtains ownership of proceeds with no knowl-
edge of the illegal transaction.
124 CONG. REc. 23,056 (1978) (emphasis added).
When speaking of the innocent owner rights of pre-illegal act owners, however,
Congress stated that the innocent owner provision was added
to make it clear that a bona fide party who has no knowledge or consent to the
property he owns having been derived from an illegal transaction, that party
would be able to establish that fact under this amendment and forfeiture would
not occur.
Id. at 23,057 (emphasis added).
Thus, when speaking of persons who acquire proceeds after the crime has occurred,
Congress appeared to recognize that the "consent" of claimants is irrelevant. By contrast,
when speaking of the rights of pre-illegal act owners, Congress recognized that "consent"
is pertinent.
204 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (1993) (plurality opin-
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act owners prior to the application of the innocent owner defense.
To hold otherwise would create a severe loophole in civil forfei-
ture laws under section 881 and would merely add to the confu-
sion that has afflicted the courts in applying the defense. Of
course, courts could avoid most of the confusion that has plagued
the interpretation and application of the innocent owner defense
were Congress to add a simple amendment to the statute.
VII. PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT TO § 881
The innocent owner defense under section 881 can be recti-
fied by merely amending the statute to include the following
definitional section:
Definitions
(m) As used in subsections (a) (4) (C); (a) (6); and (a) (7) of
this section:
(1) The term "knowledge" means having actual subjective
knowledge or being wilfully blind to the illegal acts which sub-
jected the property to forfeiture.
(2) The phrase "without the ... consent of' shall require
that the claimant did all that was reasonably possible to prevent
the illegal acts which subjected the property to forfeiture.
(3) The term "owner" means a claimant having more than
a mere nominal interest in the property at the moment that
the illegal acts subjecting the property to forfeiture occurred.
Those who are not "owners" are "post-illegal act transferees."
(4) The term "post-illegal act transferee" means a claimant
who acquires an interest in property at a time subsequent to
the moment of the illegal acts subjecting the property to forfei-
ture occurred.
(5) The phrases "without the knowledge or consent of
that owner" and "without the knowledge, consent, or willful
blindness of the owner" shall require:
(A) "owners" to prove that they were either without
knowledge of the illegal acts giving rise to forfeiture or without
consent of the illegal acts giving rise to forfeiture;
(B) "post-illegal act transferees" to prove that they
were without knowledge of the illegal acts giving rise to forfei-
ture at the time they acquired an interest in the property. The
consent of these claimants to the illegal activity is irrelevant.
This amendment resolves the following issues:
First, the amendment provides a consistent definition of
"knowledge" which utilizes the subjective actual knowledge stan-
dard and incorporates the willful blindness concept. This elimi-
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nates the ambiguities of the objective "should have known" stan-
dard and is appropriate in light of the amendment's more strin-
gent definition of consent.
Second, the amendment incorporates the Calero-Toledo stan-
dard for consent. This definition not only recognizes that persons
who know of the illegal use of their property should attempt to
take at least reasonable steps to prevent such use, but also pro-
vides the district court with the flexibility to determine what is
reasonable in the context of the multiple array of situations that
may arise. This more stringent definition for consent is particularly
appropriate in light of the amendment's incorporation of the
disjunctive interpretation of the defense.
Third, the amendment provides a consistent interpretation
which would finally end the conjunctive or disjunctive debate and
the disparate application of the innocent owner defense. The
amendment does so by distinguishing between pre-illegal act own-
ers and post-illegal act transferees. The amendment provides that
pre-illegal act owners may meet their burden under the defense by
proving that they were either without knowledge of the illegal
activity subjecting the property to forfeiture or that they did not
consent to such activity. This interpretation appropriately avoids
the harshness of the conjunctive interpretation by protecting those
who may have knowledge of the activity but truly make reasonable
attempts to prevent the activity."5
Lastly, the amendment eliminates the possibility that post-
illegal act transferees can utilize the disjunctive interpretation of
the innocent owner defense. By depriving post-illegal act trans-
ferees the opportunity to prove "lack of consent," the amendment
not only eliminates a potential loophole in forfeiture law, but also
recognizes that equity mandates that people who acquire an inter-
est in property knowing that it derives from illegal activity should
not be permitted to retain their interest in the property.
Therefore, this amendment provides consistency and fairness
to an area characterized by confusion and inequity. The amend-
ment would not only benefit claimants by providing a consistent
standard for "innocence" under the innocent owner defense, but
also would benefit the government by closing a major loophole in
drug forfeiture law.




Civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 provides for an inno-
cent owner defense whereby owners may defeat a forfeiture by
establishing that the illegal activity was committed "without the
knowledge or consent of that owner." In many instances, this de-
fense provides the only means that property owners may defeat a
forfeiture which occurred because of the illegal conduct of third
parties. The innocent owner defense has proven burdensome to
many owners, however, due to the inconsistent judicial interpreta-
tion of the defense and to the unforeseen consequences of United
States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue. These and other factors, have pro-
duced an atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding the application
and stability of the innocent owner defense.
The amendment to section 881 proposed in this Note resolves
the difficulties underlying the innocent owner defense. Specifically,
the amendment provides a consistent standard of "innocence"
under the defense by providing explicit definitions for the statuto-
ry terms "knowledge" and "consent". Moreover, the amendment
provides for an explicit disjunctive interpretation of the phrase
"without the knowledge or consent of the owner." Under this
interpretation, property owners who owned the property at the
time of the illegal conduct may defeat a forfeiture action by prov-
ing that they were either without knowledge or without consent of
a third party's illegal use of their property. The amendment also
reconciles the defense in light of the unique interests of post-ille-
gal act transferees by eliminating the possibility that these claim-
ants can utilize the disjunctive interpretation of the innocent own-
er defense. By depriving post-illegal act transferees the opportunity
to prove "lack of consent," the amendment eliminates a current
loophole in forfeiture law.
In conclusion, until the courts and legislature are willing to
provide a consistent interpretation of the innocent owner defense,
that protects the rights of all parties involved, the innocent owners
of property forfeited by the government pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
881 will continue to be casualties of this nation's war on drugs.
Anthony J Franze
* I would like to thank Professor J. Gurul6 for his assistance in the preparation of
this Note. Special thanks to my wife, Tracy, for her support and patience throughout.
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